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Abstract
The article reviews recent Israel-Palestinian negotiations
on the issue of the Palestinian refugees. It examines legal
aspects of the major issues that were involved in the nego-
tiations including who was responsible for the plight of the
refugees, the definition of who is a refugee, the existence of
a right of return, and the question of restitution and com-
pensation. The article reaches the conclusion that, in the
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, no legal “right of re-
turn” exists, implementation of such a right would be im-
practicable and UN General Assembly Resolution 194
does not impose such a right. The article shows, however,
that despite deep differences on legal positions, the parties
have endeavoured to draft language that will enable them
to proceed with a practical solution.
Résumé
L’article passe en revue les récentes négociations israélo-
palestiniennes sur la question des réfugiés palestiniens. Il
examine les aspects légaux des principales questions exa-
minées durant les pourparlers, y compris la question de sa-
voir qui était responsable du problème des réfugiés, la
définition de qui est un réfugié, la reconnaissance du droit
au retour et la question de restitution et de compensation.
L’article conclut que dans le contexte du conflit israélo-
arabe, il n’existait pas, légalement parlant, de « droit au re-
tour », que la mise en vigueur d’un tel droit serait
pratiquement impossible et que la résolution 194 de l’Assem-
blée générale des Nations Unies n’imposait pas un tel droit.
L’article montre cependant que malgré le grand fossé sépa-
rant la position légale des deux parties, elles se sont éver-
tuées à utiliser un langage dans les projets de règlement
qui laisse la voie ouverte à une solution pratique.
T
he continuing plight of the Palestinian Arab refugees
is a human tragedy that has lasted for more than fifty
years and it is clear that without a resolution of the
issues involved there can be no final settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
At the Camp David talks held in July 2000 and in talks
held at Taba in January 2001, Israelis and Palestinians for
the first time attempted to negotiate a solution to the
refugee problem. There had been innummerable  pre-
vious polemic exchanges but here, for the first time, the
parties attempted to reach an agreed-upon solution. The
negotiations, however, did not reach a successful conclu-
sion. The various reports and accounts of the discussions1
show that there were five major areas of disagreement,
namely: who was responsible for the plight of the refu-
gees, the definition of who is a refugee, the existence of a
right of return, the question of restitution and compen-
sation, and the relevance of the issue of Jews who fled
Arab States.
The Arab-Israeli conflict, although minuscule on a world
scale, nevertheless has captured the attention of world opi-
nion, and the international press follows with fascination
the minutiae of the conflict. The fact that the land is the land
of the Bible and the presence of sites holy to Christianity,
Islam, and Judaism no doubt are factors in the world’s
fascination with the issue.
International law continues to play a major role in all
attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This role can
be attributed to a number of factors. Both the Arabs and the
Jews come from societies based on written legal codes (the
Koran and the Bible), and the obligation to comply with
legal norms permeates their everyday life. The League of
Nations and its successor, the United Nations, have been
actively involved in Arab-Israeli affairs in their legal context
since the 1923 Mandate for Palestine called for the estab-
lishment of “a Jewish national home” in Palestine.2 Both
Israelis and Palestinians attempt to buttress their respective
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positions by recourse to legal arguments.3 World public
opinion will not support a position that is regarded as illegal
under international law and hence both parties attempt to
brand the other side’s positions as illegal. Agreement be-
tween the parties, if reached, will take the form of binding
agreements that will then themselves be subject to the
international law of treaties.
Both sides had their international lawyers involved in
preparing papers for their negotiators and, in most cases,
the lawyers participated in the actual negotiations. An as-
sessment of the legal aspects of the four issues involved is
therefore germane both to examining what went wrong and
to possible future solutions.
Responsibility for the Refugee Problem
During the Camp David and Taba talks, Palestinian nego-
tiators demanded that Israel accept responsibility for the
creation of the Arab refugee problem. The Palestinians have
stated that it was the issue of East Jerusalem “. . . and Israel’s
refusal to accept legal and moral responsibility for turning
more than 3 million Palestinians into refugees that brought
the summit to an end.”4
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their
homes as a result of the 1948 war. Whether these refugees
fled as a result of intimidation by Israeli forces,5 at the
instigation of the invading Arab armies,6 or, as is most
likely, as a result of a combination of both, there can be no
argument as to the human tragedy of this exodus. It does
not, however, appear to be equitable or historically correct
to place the responsibility with Israel. The root cause of the
fighting that caused such tragedy to the Palestinian Arabs
and such loss of lives to Israel7 was the rejection by the Arab
States of the 1947 UN Proposal to partition Palestine into
an Arab and a Jewish State. The Arab States openly declared
that they were sending their armies into Palestine to prevent
the creation of the proposed Jewish State.8 The decision to
send in the Arab armies had in fact been made in 1947, prior
to the establishment of Israel.9 In May 1948, the U.S. rep-
resentative to the UN Security Council, commenting on the
Jordanian admission that the Arab Legion had invaded
Palestine, stated, “We have here the highest type of evidence
of the international violation of the law: the admission by
those who are committing the violation.”10 The Russian
representative to the Security Council, Gromyko, stated
even more bluntly, “What is happening in Palestine can
only be described as a military operation organised by a
group of States against the Jewish State.”11
The preamble to the  only  decision ever taken under
Chapter VII of the Charter by the UN Security Council in
relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict explicitly stated:
Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of
Israel has indicated its acceptance of a prolongation of the truce
in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have
rejected successive appeals of the UN Mediator and of the
Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948 for the prolon-
gation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently
developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine.12
Most telling of all, perhaps, is the 2002 official website of the
Arab League, which states, “Among the goals the League set for
itself were winning independence for all Arabs still under alien
rule, and to prevent the Jewish minority in Palestine (then
governed by the British) from creating a Jewish state.”13
Prior to the Arab invasion there were no Palestinian Arab
refugees. Issa Nakhleh, who was the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine in
New York and Chairman of the Palestine Arab delegation,
writes:
It is an historic fact that prior to the month of April 1948
Palestine Arabs were winning the fight against the Jews throu-
ghout the country, Arabs dominated more than 82% of the area
of Palestine, Jews were unable to travel on highways between
important cities. All Jewish quarters in Jerusalem were about to
surrender. Jews lost every battle they fought against Palestine
Arabs.14
There are presumably two reasons for the Palestinians
making such a concerted effort to cause Israel to accept the
moral and legal responsibility for the creation of the refugee
problem. The first is to achieve vindication of what the
Palestinians feel has been an injustice and the second is to
lay the foundations for a subsequent claim for compensa-
tion from Israel.
The unofficial understanding reached between Yossi
Beilin from Israel and Abu Mazen of the PLO avoids the
issue by using language whereby “the Israel side acknow-
ledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Pales-
tinian people as a result of the war of 1947–1949.”15 The
Clinton plan uses nearly identical language.16
Who Is a Palestinian Refugee?
The most common estimate is that in 1947–48 some
700,00017 Arab Palestinians fled their homes.18 Other estima-
tes vary from 400,00019 to 900,000.20 In accordance with the
1967 UN Refugee Convention, a person ceases to be a refu-
gee if “he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the
protection of the country of his new nationality.”21 If one
were to apply this criterion, together with the rule that only
persons who actually fled their homes are refugees, then the
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authentic number of refugees today would be some two or
three hundred thousand at most. However, due to political
pressure from Arab States, Palestinians refugees were excluded
from the UN Convention definition of refugees and UNRWA
grantedstatusofrefugees toalldirectdescendantsof refugees.22
It is believed that this extension of refugee status is unprece-
dented in international law. It has led to a situation where some
3,500,000 persons are now considered Palestinian refugees and
Palestinian spokesmen claim that all 3,500,000 have the “right
of return.” Needless to say, over 90 per cent of these persons
have never lived in the territory that is now Israel.
“Right of Return”
Palestinian negotiators demand that “Israel must recognize
the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes”
in what is now Israel in accordance with “a well-established
norm in international law and practice, namely the right of
return.”23 The existence of such a right under international
law in the circumstances of the Arab-Israeli conflict is, how-
ever, in dispute. Palestinian demands for a right of return
are coupled with their call for self-determination. Dividing
historical Palestine into two states, Israel and an Arab State
of Palestine, is incompatible with then granting an “inalie-
nable” right to the same Palestinian Arabs to move to Israel.
Benvenisti and Zamir found that “international practice . . .
does not support the claim that the right of return following
mass relocation of population is recognized under interna-
tional law. This observation of state practice is enhanced by
the lack of support in legal literature for the right of refugees
to return to the country they have fled.”24
If such a “right of return” were to exist, it would need to
be based on one of the two accepted sources of international
law, namely, an international treaty to which Israel is a party
or a rule of customary international law.25
Does the “Right of Return” Exist as a Treaty
Obligation?
In the UN treaties that deal specifically with refugees, there
is no reference to a “right of return.”26 Israel is a party,
however, to two general human rights treaties that refer to a
right to return: The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination,27 in which Article 5-(d)(ii)
refers to “the right to leave any country, including one’s own,
and to return to one’s country,” and the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,28 in which Article
12(4) states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his own country.”
The question arises  as to the  meaning of  the phrase
“one’s country” or “his own country” in the two treaties.
There are writers who believe the phrases should be un-
derstood as applying, in addition to nationals, to perma-
nent residents of a country and other persons with ties to
the country.  State interpretation of a right  to re-entry,
however, appears overwhelmingly to be applied only to
nationals of the State. This is the phrase used in the 1969
American Convention on Human Rights, Article 22(5): “No
one can be expelled from the territory of the state of which
he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it.”29 The
word “national” is also used in the 1950 European Human
Rights Convention, Protocol No.4, Article 3(2): “No one shall
be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of
which he is a national.”30 Apparently no government inter-
prets the Convention as meaning that the right applies to
persons other than nationals or persons who were nationals.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill writes, “The ‘right to return’, in particu-
lar, is accepted as a normal incident of nationality.”31
Mass or Individual Rights
The human rights conventions referred to, insofar as they
grant rights, do so to individuals and were not intended to
deal with population exchanges such as occurred in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Stig Jagerskiold, the right
of return or the right to enter one’s country in the 1966
International Covenant:
. . . is intended to apply to individuals asserting an individual right.
There was no intention here to address the claims of masses of
people who have been displaced as a by-product of war or by
political transfers of territory or population, such as the relocation
of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe during and after the
SecondWorldWar, theflightofthePalestinians fromwhatbecame
Israel, or the movement of Jews from the Arab countries.32
It is also apparent that the right of return applies to indivi-
duals who wish to live as citizens of the State to which they
wish to return. It is clearly not realistic to suggest that hun-
dreds of thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees feel such
strong ties with Israel that they wish to become loyal Israeli
citizens. An Egyptian Foreign Minister explained, “In deman-
ding the return of the Palestinian refugees, the Arabs mean
their return as masters, not slaves: or, to put it quite clearly –
the intention is the extermination of Israel.”33 Six years later,
the Prime Minister of Lebanon declared, “The day on which
the Arabs’ hope for the return of the refugees to Palestine is
realized will be the day of Israel’s extermination.”34 A leading
Arab Palestinian lawyer put it bluntly when he stated, “The
Palestinian Arab refugees have certain inalienable rights inclu-
ding the right of sovereignty over Palestine.”35
UN Resolution 194
Although Arab States voted against UN Resolution 194 (III)
of 11 December 194836 and although Israel was not a mem-
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ber of the UN at the time the Resolution was adopted,37 it is
now claimed that the Resolution obliges Israel to recognize
a right of return. Paragraph 11 of the Resolution states that
the UN General Assembly:
Resolve that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so
at the earliest practicable date and that compensation should be
paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for
loss of or damage to property which under principles of inter-
national law or in equity, should be made good by the Govern-
ment or authorities responsible.
Some writers claim, “Paragraph 11 recognized that un-
der international law the Palestinian people were entitled
to return to their homeland and receive economic compen-
sation.”38 Further General Assembly Resolutions have re-
peatedly referred to Resolution 194 and described Palestine
refugee rights as “inalienable.”
UN General Assembly resolutions cannot, however, cre-
ate international law. With the exception of resolutions
dealing with budget and internal UN affairs, States are not
obliged to comply with resolutions of the UN General
Assembly. The UN General Assembly is not a law-making
body and neither the UN Charter nor any other legal ins-
trument has empowered it with a law-making capacity.39
The fact that the UN may repeat or reaffirm a resolution
does not empower it with legal force. In Weil’s eloquent
phrase, “Neither is there any warrant for considering that by
dint of repetition, non-normative resolutions can betransmu-
ted into positive law through a sort of incantatory effect.40
As to the actual text of the Resolution, the word “right”
is not used, although Arab spokesmen repeatedly and in-
correctly attribute the word “right” to its text. The Resolu-
tion uses the word “should” and not “shall.” In UN
documents the word “should” is regarded as recommenda-
tory language and is not used where an obligation is set out.
“The term ‘should’ is clear on its face: it is hortatory, not
obligatory.”41 The reference to international law is as regards
the clause on compensation and not on the issue of “return.”42
The Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding makes no explicit
reference to Resolution 194. The Clinton proposal in regard
to the Resolution states: “ The parties would agree that this
implements Resolution 194.”
The Saudi-initiated Arab League peace plan of 28 March
2002 refers to “achievement of a just solution to the Pales-
tinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance
with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.”43 This text, by
using the word “agreed,” attempts to soften the earlier Arab
position that Resolution 194 was mandatory.44 Were Israel
to accept the wording of the Arab League proposal, how-
ever, it would then be bound to act in accordance with the
substance of UN Resolution 194, a demand Israel has rejec-
ted for reasons set out above.
The “Right of Return” in Customary
International Law
Some writers, aware of the fact that UN General Assembly
Resolutions cannot create international law, claim that para-
graph 11 of Resolution 194 reflected customary internatio-
nal law at the time.45 If a right of return were a rule of
customary international law then it would, of course, be
binding on Israel, irrespective of Israeli agreement or recog-
nition of the rule.
The existence of a rule of customary international law
requires both State practice46 and opinio juris,47 namely, that
the State practice was part of a general recognition that a
legal obligation is involved. It has been claimed that such a
customary rule can be ascertained from the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states, in Article
13(2): “Everyone has the right to leave any country, inclu-
ding his own, and to return to his country.”
The Universal Declaration is a universally respected sta-
tement of ideals and has inspired much human rights legis-
lation, including legislation in Israel. It is not, however,
binding law. Elements of the declaration have indeed been
set out in various human rights treaties and they are binding
on the parties to those treaties. Those elements of the
Universal Declaration that have not been incorporated into
international treaties remain lofty hortatory call to States;
they are not, however, binding international law.
Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration refers to “his
country.” Article 21 of the Universal Declaration uses the
same phrase and refers to the fact that “everyone has the
right to take part in the government of his country.”(em-
phasis added). This is clearly a right attributable only to
citizens and since the same phrase is used in Article 13(2), it
is logical to deduce that Article 13(2) also refers to citizens.48
State  experience shows that States have  indeed often
allowed the return of their citizens who fled during wars.
However, where there has been a division of a territory into
two States on an ethnic or religious basis, there has been no
such “right of return.” The Muslims who fled India for
Pakistan have no “right of return” to India, the same being
true for Hindus who fled from what is now Pakistan to
India. The Sudeten Germans have no “right of return” to
the Czech Republic. Julius Stone points out that in fact:
Resettlement . . . has been the effective solution for the far
greater and more complex refugee problems in Europe after
World War II. It is a melancholy fact that this more humane
course came to so little in the Middle East over so long a time
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that, for the Arab States concerned, the refugee problem was
more useful than its solution.49
Right of Return in the Post-Oslo Peace Process
In formal presentations, Arab representatives demanded an
unconditional right of return. They pointed out, however,
that not all refugees would choose to return but insisted that
the individual refugee make the choice. During a meeting
with President U.S. President Bill Clinton, the Palestinian
representative, Nabil Shaat, estimated that 10 to 20 per cent
of the refugees would choose to return. President Clinton
responded that, according to that estimate, the number of
refugees Israel would have to absorb would be between four
and eight hundred thousand.50
The formula used in the Beilin-Abu Mazen under-
standing was:
1. Whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in
international law and natural justice, it recognizes that the
prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as
the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948,
have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable.
The Palestinian side, thus, declares its readiness to accept and
implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this
is possible, the welfare and well being of these refugees.
2. Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and mate-
rial suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the
war of 1947–49. It further acknowledges the Palestinian re-
fugees’ right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to
compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses.
3. and 4. (The Articles deal with the establishment of an inter-
national fund.)
5. Deals with Israeli willingness to allow family reunification
and absorption of refugees in “specially defined cases.”
6. Deals with the absorption of refugees in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
7. The PLO considers the implementation of the above a full
and final settlement of the refugee issue in all its dimensions. It
further undertakes that no additional claims or demands arising
from this issue will made upon the full implementation of this
Framework agreement.51
On the question of the refugees, U.S. President Bill Clin-
ton’s comments, presented orally to both parties, were:
I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations
and less to what will happen on a practical level. I believe that
Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffe-
ring caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war
and the need to assist the international community in addres-
sing the problem. . . . The fundamental gap is on how to handle
the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue
and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear
to be abandoning the principle.
The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return
thatwould implya righttoimmigrate toIsrael indefianceofIsrael’s
sovereign policies and admission or that would threaten the char-
acter of the state. Any solution must address both needs. The
solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach. . .
the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and
the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.
Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be
that the Palestinian State should be the focal point for the
Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out
that Israel accept some of these refugees.
I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of
return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return
to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of Palesti-
nian people to return to the area.
I propose two alternatives
1. both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to
return to historic Palestine, or
2. both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to
return to their homeland.
The agreement will define the implementation of this general right
in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list
the five possible homes for the refugees:
1. The State of Palestine
2. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine
in the land swap
3. Rehabilitation in host country
4. Resettlement in third country
5. Admission to Israel
In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the
return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and area acquired in the
land swap would be right [sic] to all Palestinian refugees, while
rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries
and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those
countries.
Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish
apolicysothatsome[sic] therefugeeswouldbeabsorbedintoIsrael
consistent with Israel sovereign decision.
I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population
in Lebanon.
The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.52
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Compensation for Abandoned Property of
Palestinian Refugees
The Palestinian Arab refugees left behind, in what is now
Israel, large amounts of property. Most of the property
was used by Israel to settle Jews who fled from Arab states.
Benvenisti and Zamir point out that this is normal inter-
national procedure and that during population transfers
in India, Pakistan, and cases in Europe that they enume-
rate, “immovable property left by expellees was seized by
the Governments, which then used it to settle the inco-
ming refugees.”53 They add that in no case of massive
relocation “have the refugees regained the property they
left behind.”54 There are, however, examples of States
paying compensation for such property55 and Israeli ne-
gotiators have agreed to pay compensation for the proper-
ty Arab refugees left in what is now Israel. Clearly, so long
as a state of war or armed conflict continues, Israel is
entitled to freeze the right to such property. However
when  a  final settlement of the  conflict is  reached, the
refugees will be entitled to receive compensation for pro-
perty they possessed. The terms and conditions for such
compensation will have to be agreed upon. Israel also
demanded that, when negotiations commence on the
question of compensation, account must be taken of the
property of Jews who fled Arab countries and who were
forced to leave all their property behind.
Compensation for the Suffering of the Refugees
Above and beyond the right of compensation for proper-
ty, Palestinian negotiators demand compensation to the
refugees for their suffering. Such a demand is linked to the
demand that Israel accept responsibility for causing the
refugee problem. Since Israeli negotiators see the invasion
by Arab States as the primary cause of the Palestinian
refugee problem, needless to say Israel is not willing to
accept responsibility or the consequent obligation to
compensate. Benvenisti and Zamir point out, “Claims for
reparations are rarely pursued. Since such claims are ba-
sed on fault, the other side must be persuaded to concede
its aggression or this issue must be litigated for the claim
to succeed.”56
Clearly, neither side in the Arab-Israeli conflict is wil-
ling to see itself as the aggressor. The Beilin-Abu Mazen
understanding deals with the issue of compensation for
the refugees by stating that Israel “acknowledges . . . their
right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and
material losses” and proposing that an international fund
be set up to help resettlement of the Palestinian Arab
refugees and that Israel participate in such a fund.
Compensation to Jews Who Fled from Arab
Countries
Some 700,000 Jews fled Arab countries in the years
1948–49.57 They have been successfully absorbed by Israel
and now form an integral part of the fabric of Israeli society.
They do not regard themselves as refugees nor are they
regarded as such. Needless to say there is no talk of their
“right to return to Arab countries.” On immigrating to Israel
they were often forced to leave their property behind and in
many cases, such as in Iraq, special laws were passed depri-
ving them of all rights to their property. It is Israel’s position
that when discussing issues of compensation, the property
rights of the Jews who fled Arab countries be taken into
account.
The Issue of Refugees in the Legal Instruments of
the Peace Process
The first agreed framework for a peace settlement was the
1967 UN Security Council Resolution number 242.58 The
Resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter and therefore was not binding as such, but all parties to
the conflict have subsequently accepted it as a framework;
hence its binding character derives from the agreement of
the parties to the conflict. Resolution 242 refers to the necessity
of “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.” The
Resolution makes no reference to UNGA Resolution 194, or to
a “right of return.” Furthermore, the Resolution refers to
refugees without limiting the term to Palestinian refugees, thus
enabling the issue of compensation for the property of Jews
from Arab countries to come within its ambit.
The 1978 Camp David Framework for Peace in the Mid-
dle East stated: “Egypt and Israel will work with each other
and with other agreed parties to establish agreed procedures
for a prompt and permanent implementation of the reso-
lution of the refugee problem.”59
The 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Govern-
ment – the Oslo Agreement – reaffirmed UN Security Council
Resolution 242 and stated that the issue of refugees should be
dealt with as part of “permanent status negotiations.”60
The 1994 Treaty of Peace with Jordan states that the Parties
will seek to resolve the refugee problem, in accordance with
international law, inappropriate forums, including the frame-
work of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees, and in
negotiations, in a framework to beagreed, bilateralorotherwi-
se, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent
status negotiations pertaining to the Territories that came
under Israeli military government in 1967.61
The agreements with Egypt, with the PLO, and with
Jordan contain no reference to UNGA Resolution 194 or to
The Palestinian Refugees, International Law and the Peace Process

a “right of return.” The agreement with the PLO received
worldwide support; the Secretary of State of the United
States and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation
signed it as witnesses. The authors of the Israel-PLO agree-
ment shared the Nobel Peace Prize and the agreement was
welcomed by a special Resolution of the UN General As-
sembly.62 The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip agreement was signed by
representatives of the United States, the Russian Federation,
Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union as witnesses.
A valid argument can be made that, by making these
agreements, none of which mentions a “right of return,”
the PLO and the Arab States, with the blessing of the world
community, implicitly acknowledged the reality that a
“right of return” is not an option in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The Future
For some sixty-five years, commencing with the 1937 (Peel)
Palestine Royal Commission, the consensus among political
and international legal observers has been that historic Pa-
lestine needs to be divided into two States, an Arab State and
a Jewish State. Such a division is premised on the notion of
the right of Palestinians to self-determination in their terri-
tory and a similar right for Israel in its territory. The border
between two such States needs to be negotiated but, whate-
ver the border, such self-determination is incompatible with
a demand for the recognition of a right of Palestinians to
settle in Israel. Ruth Lapidoth summarizes the legal position
under international law as being that “neither under the
general international conventions, nor under the major UN
resolutions, nor under the relevant agreements between the
parties, do the Palestinian refugees have a right to return to
Israel.”63
Thirty years ago William Fulbright commented, “For the
majority of refugees, repatriation would probably be nei-
ther feasible nor desired.”64 In January 2001, President
Clinton declared that Israel should absorb some refugees
but that “. . . you cannot expect Israel to acknowledge an
unlimited right of return to present day Israel. . . . We
cannot expect Israel to make a decision that would threaten
the very foundations of the State of Israel and would under-
mine the whole logic of peace.”65
Some one million of the Arab refugees who claim a right
of return reside, at present, in the West Bank and Gaza.
Their claim therefore is not to have a right of return to what
was historically Palestine, for they are already live there, but
to that part of Palestine that is present-day Israel.
The Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding is premised on the
reality that a right of return will be to a Palestinian State and
not to Israel. The understanding states that although the
Palestinians believe “that the right of the Palestinian refu-
gees to return to their homes is enshrined in international
law and natural justice . . . the realities that have been
created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the imple-
mentation of this right impracticable.” Israel “acknow-
ledges the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to the
Palestinian State and their right to compensation and reha-
bilitation for moral and material losses.”66 Allowing refu-
gees in camps in Arab countries to “return” to a Palestinian
State in the West Bank and Gaza would be allowing their
return to what historically was Palestine. In 2001 the chief
U.S. negotiator for the Middle East pithily summarized the
issue: “The right of return of Palestinians to their State
makes perfect sense, the right of return to Israel made no
sense if you are going to have a two-state solution.”67
Echoes of the Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding are
found in President Clinton’s peace plan where he refers to
“the right of return to their homeland where it is clearly
established that their homeland means the Palestinian
State.”68 At the September 2000 Taba talks between Israel
and the Palestinians the refugee problem was perhaps the
major issue. The Israeli proposal during the Taba talks69
again echoed the Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding that the
Palestinians would have the right of return to the future
Palestinian State together with the further options of being
absorbed in the host states or immigrating to third states
willing to absorb them. A further proposal was that Israel
would agree to accept an as-yet-unarticulated number of
refugees on the humanitarian basis of family reunification.
An international fund would be set up to help cover the cost
of resettlement and rehabilitation. The final settlement would
be considered as implementation of all relevant international
resolutions. A settlement of claims would also deal with the
question of the property of Jews who fled Arab countries.
It has been said that the saddest phrase in the English
language is “if only.” This year Israel celebrates fifty-five
years of independence. For many Palestinians, however,
this year means fifty-five years since the creation of the
refugee problem. It need not have been so. With wise Arab
leadership at the time, it could now have been fifty-five
years of independence for both Israelis and Palestinians.
The Beilin-Abu Mazen “understanding” and the Clinton
“comments” could well be a blueprint for a practical, prag-
matic solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. It is to
be hoped that, this time, a Palestinian leadership will grasp
the opportunity and not, as has occurred so often in the
past, discard it in the chimeric hope that a deus ex machina
will somehow turn back the clock of history.
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